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Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Provision in Shoplifting Statute
Declared in Violation of Maryland Constitution. Getz and Getz v.
Hutzlers, Inc. (Sup. Ct. of Balto. City, June 8, 1965), The Daily
Record, June 15, 1965, p. 2, col. 6. Plaintiffs, in a suit based on alleged
false imprisonment and slander by employees of defendant, filed a
motion under Maryland Rule 502 alleging that a provision of the
Maryland Shoplifting Statute,1 which defines the crime of shoplifting
and specifies the penalties therefor, was in violation of the Maryland
Constitution.2 The provision in question creates a qualified immunity
from civil liability for false imprisonment or arrest.' The Superior
Court of Baltimore City ruled that the statute was void for non-
compliance with the Maryland Constitution, because it was foreign to
the subject matter stated in the title ("Shoplifting") and because it
was not mentioned in the title in any way.
The legislative titling provision of the Maryland Constitution has
been the source of a great deal of litigation.4 The objectives of the
constitutional requirement are to prevent the combining of two or more
separate subjects in the same act, to notify the members of the legis-
lature of the contents of the bills before them, and to inform the citizens
of proposed legislation.5 The Maryland Court of Appeals has broadly
interpreted this provision for many years,6 but has, on occasion, found
1. MD. CowD ANN. art. 27, § 551A (1964 Supp.). See Kerr, Shoplifting and
the Law of Arrest: A Problem in Effective Social Legislation, 19 MD. L. Rgv. 28
(1959), for a discussion of the necessity for a shoplifting statute in Maryland.
2. MD. CONST. art. III, § 29, provides that "every Law enacted by the General
Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title."
Plaintiffs' contention was based on this section.
3. A merchant, agent or employee of the merchant, who detains or causes
the arrest of any person shall not be held civilly liable for detention, slander,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or false arrest . . . provided that . . I
the merchant, agent or employee of the merchant, had at the time of such detention
or arrest probable cause to believe that the person committed the crime of
shoplifting .
MD. COD ANN. art. 27, § 551A(c) (1964 Supp.).
4. See Everstine, Titles of Legislative Acts, 9 MD. L. Rnv. 197 (1948).
5. Leonardo v. County Commissioners, 214 Md. 287, 298, 134 A.2d 284, 289 (1957).
See Everstine, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 206 A.2d 678 (1965)
Hitchins v. Cumberland, 177 Md. 72, 8 A.2d 626 (1939) ; Crouse v. State, 130 Md. 364,
100 Atil. 361 (1917) ; and County Commissioners of Dorchester Co. v. Meekins,
50 Md. 28 (1878).
In Beshore, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that a town resolution providing
for both annexation and zoning of a tract of land was valid, even though zoning was
not mentioned in the title, because the fixing of zoning requirements was a proper
circumstance and condition of newly annexed land, and therefore was germane to
the subject.
The Hitchins case held that an act entitled, "An Act to authorize . . . to issue
bonds .. .and to use the proceeds thereof for the purpose of paying expenses incident
to the construction of a Cross-Town Water Line" was sufficient, although the Act
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some statutes to be void.' The court has consistently applied a general
presumption which favors the validity of a statute' and has also applied
a specific presumption that in order for a statute to be declared void
because of a defect in the title, it must be clear that there is something
in the body of the act that is entirely foreign to the subject matter
described in the title."
A great number of states have provisions in their constitutions
similar to the section of the Maryland Constitution discussed in the
principal case.'" Most courts have interpreted the titling requirements
liberally" and have adopted rules quite similar to those applied by the
Maryland Court of Appeals, affording every presumption in favor of
the validity of the statute in question. However, statutes have also
been declared void in a number of states on account of defective titles.'
2
In the present case, the Baltimore Court recognized the rule
followed in Maryland, but felt that the provision in question was so
foreign to the subject matter stated in the title ("Shoplifting") that it
must be declared void. The Court pointed out that the Shoplifting
Statute was a criminal statute, there being no indication in the title that
a provision creating immunity from civil liability was included.
itself authorized the proceeds of the bonds to be used, not only for paying of such
expenses, but also for the other necessary purposes affecting the water supply of the city.
In Crouse the court felt that the title, "providing for the creation by popular vote
of anti-saloon territory within Carroll County . . ." was not inconsistent with the
provisions in the body of the act calling for the submission of the question to the voters
of the whole county.
Finally, in Meekins the court upheld an act entitled "... to repeal sections 89
and 90 . . . , title 'Dorchester County,' sub-title 'County Commissioners' " even
though it consisted of twenty-one sections providing for the redistricting of the county,
the appointment of a Treasurer of the county, the appointment of collectors of the
county, and the delegation of duties and powers to the Treasurer of the county.
7. See, e.g., Culp v. Commissioners of Chestertown, 154 Md. 620, 141 Atl. 410
(1928) (where the court held that an act entitled "An act to provide for construction
of curbs . . . and to levy an annual tax for the payment of such bonds [issued to
pay for the construction]" was invalid because it failed to refer to the provision of the
act that part of the cost of certain pavements should be paid by adjoining property
owners); United Rys. & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 121 Md. 552, 88 Atl. 617 (1913) (where the court felt that an act requiring
the Railways Company, on improved streets, to repave between their tracks was
unconstitutional because the title simply described the two statutes as empowering
Baltimore City to create a paving commission) ; Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466,
87 Atl. 413 (1912) (where the court stated that an act relating to good roads in
Baltimore County, which by its title apparently limited the cost to one and a half
million dollars, while in fact unable to involve and burden the county with costs largely
in excess of that sum, was therefore unconstitutional and void).
8. See Baltimore Transit Company v. Metropolitan Transit Authority, 232 Md.
509, 194 A.2d 643 (1963) ; Allied American Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 (1958).
9. Warren v. Board of Appeals, 226 Md. 1, 172 A.2d 124 (1960).
10. For a list of the states which have such provisions, see Ruud, No Law Shall
Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. Rzv. 389, 453 (1958).
11. See, e.g., People v. Osterveen, 154 Cal. App. 2d 620, 316 P.2d 390 (1957)
Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1964) ; Hall v. Calhoun County
Bd., 373 Mich. 642, 130 N.W.2d 373 (1964); State v. Weindorf, 361 S.W.2d 806
(Mo. 1962) ; Tompkins v. District Boundary Bd., 180 Ore. 339, 177 P.2d 416 (1947) ;
State v. The Praetorians, 143 Tex. 565, 186 S.W.2d 973 (1945). See also, Ruud,
supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., State v. City of Wichita, 184 Kan. 196, 335 P.2d 786 (1959) ; Feagin
v. Texas, 166 Tex. Crim. 3, 310 S.W.2d 99 (1957).
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CRIMINAL LAW - Gideon v. Wainwright Applied Retro-
actively in Maryland. Manning v. State, 237 Md. 349, 206 A.2d 563
(1965). Petitioner Manning was tried and convicted of various
offenses in the Municipal Court of Baltimore City and sentenced to a
term of imprisonment totalling five years. At his trial, petitioner was
neither advised of his right to counsel nor was he given assistance
of counsel. Under the then prevailing rule of Betts v. Brady, a
criminal defendant in a state court was not denied due process of law
when not represented by counsel unless the trial was "offensive to
the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right."2 Subsequent
to petitioner's conviction, the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wain-
wright,' which overruled the Betts case and made absolute a defendant's
right to counsel in a "serious" state prosecution. Petitioner conse-
quently sought relief under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure
Act.4 The Criminal Court of Baltimore City held that petitioner's
election to waive a jury trial and not to appeal constituted a waiver
of his right to counsel even under Gideon;" and that Maryland Rule
719, requiring that. a defendant be advised of his right to counsel and
that counsel be appointed for indigent defendants if they so elect when
the "offense charged is one for which the maximum punishment is
death, or imprisonment for six months or more, or a fine of $500 or
more, or both . . .",6 did not apply to Municipal Court proceedings.
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, applying Maryland Rule
719 to the Municipal Court proceeding and applying Gideon retro-
actively to vacate petitioner's convictions.
The Maryland Court of Appeals did not discuss the legal-philo-
sophical considerations in the case.' Foremost in their eyes was the
fact that the Supreme Court had overruled Betts v. Brady in a habeas
corpus case collaterally attacking a conviction, rather than in a case
before it on direct appeal. Thus, the principle announced in Gideon
was applied retroactively in that very case. That particular argument
has also been persuasive in other courts which have applied Gideon
1. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2. Id. at 473.
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. MD. CoDZ ANN. art. 27, § 645-A (1957).
5. On appeal, however, the state conceded that petitioner had not intelligently
waived his right to counsel in accordance with the criteria for waiver set down in
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, at 516 (1962): "Presuming waiver from a silent
record is impermissible. The record must show . . . that an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is
not waiver."
6. MD. R. PROC. 719.
7. Cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 (1965). The
Supreme Court here found no philosophical barrier to the prospective overruling only
of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
rejected Blackstone's traditional view that a court does not pronounce new law, but
"discovers" and expands already existing law. The Court instead adopted the more
modern Austinian approach that judges make law "interstitially by filling in withjudicial interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or common law terms
that alone are but empty crevices of the law."
1965]
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retroactively.' Secondly, the Supreme Court did not say in its opinion
whether Gideon was to be applied retroactively. The Maryland Court
felt that this was an exceptionally meaningful omission since twenty-
two states submitted an amicus brief which requested that the decision
be given only prospective application. The Court's third ground for
holding Gideon retroactive was that the Supreme Court had remanded
to state courts by per curiam opinion over forty cases in which the
accused was not given the assistance of counsel. Most of these cases
were pre-Gideon convictions.9
These remands, coupled with the decision of Doughty v. Maxwell,'"
have convinced state and federal courts that the Supreme Court in-
tended Gideon to be applied retroactively." By holding Gideon retro-
active, the Maryland Court of Appeals has followed the overwhelming
weight of authority, for with rare exception, Gideon has been given
retrospective application.'
CRIMINAL LAW - Felony-Murder - Responsibility for the
Death of Co-Felon. People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402
P.2d 130 (1965). Defendant was convicted' of the murder of his
co-felon under the felony-murder rule.2 While defendant was in an-
8. U.S. ex rel. Craig v. Meyers, 329 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1964) ; Barnes v. State,
169 So. 2d 313 (1964) ; Janiec v. State, 85 N.J. Super. 68, 203 A.2d 727 (1964).
9. See, e.g., Jordan v. Wiman, 273 Ala. 709, 142 So. 2d 679 (1962), remanded,
372 U.S. 780 (1963); Picklesimer v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1962),
remanded, 375 U.S. 2 (1963); Patterson v. State, 227 Md. 194, 175 A.2d 746,
remanded, 372 U.S. 776 (1963); Gainer v. Pennsylvania, 196 Pa. Super. 578, 176 A.2d
177 (1962), remanded, 372 U.S. 768 (1963). See generally, Note, 61 MICH. L. REv.
219, 272 (1962) ; and Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 747, 750 (1964); Note, 25 U. Pnr. L. REv.
719, 736 (1964).
10. Doughty was accused of rape and convicted without assistance of counsel.
In a habeas corpus proceeding before the Supreme Court of Ohio, it was held that
Doughty waived his right to counsel by pleading guilty. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and, per curiam, remanded Doughty in the "light of Gideon
v. Wainwright." On remand, the Ohio Court refused to apply Gideon, distinguishing
it by the fact that Gideon had requested counsel. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed. 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d 368 (1962), remanded, 372 U.S. 781
(1963), relief den., 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963), reversed, 376 U.S.
202 (1963).
11. See, e.g., Durocher v. La Vallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 337 U.S.
998 (1964) ; Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1964).
12. See, e.g., Geather v. State, 165 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1964) ; In re Plainer, 371
Mich. 656, 124 N.W.2d 773 (1963) ; People v. Callahan, 19 A.D.2d 585, 240 N.Y.S. 460
(1963); State ex rel. May v. Boles, 139 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1964). See U.S. v.
Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964), and the concurring opinion of Judge Sobeloff in
Jones v. Cunningham, 319 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1963). Contra, Authur v. People, 393
P.2d 371 (1964). The court held in this case that a reading of Gideon indicates its
application is to be prospective rather than retrospective. See also Craig v. Banmiller,
410 Pa. 584, 189 A.2d 875, ree'd, McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964).
1. People v. Washington, 40 Cal. Rptr. 791 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964), noted in
33 FORDHzAm L. REv. 721 (1965), 16 HASTINGS L.J. 620 (1965), 10 VILL. L. REv.
579 (1965).
2. As established by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 189 (1955). Maryland's
statute is substantially the same, MD. COIE ANN. art. 27, §§ 407, 408, 410 & 411 (1957).
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other room, looting the gas station's safe, his co-felon entered an
adjacent room with pistol in hand and was fatally wounded by the
owner of the gas station. On appeal, the conviction was reversed,3 the
court holding that "for a defendant to be guilty of murder under the
felony-murder rule the act of killing must be committed by the defendant
or by his accomplice acting in furtherance of their common design.""
Cases involving extension of the felony-murder rule to situations
in which the deceased was killed by someone other than the defendant
have provoked much discussion,' especially those cases holding contrary
to the instant case.' While the commentators generally agree that the
felony-murder rule should be limited as in the instant case, the case
law has been slow to adopt this view due to strict interpretation of
felony-murder statutes,7 which typically state that "[a]II murder . . .
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate ... robbery...
is murder of the first degree."'
Judicial extension of the felony-murder rule, as in Commonwealth
v. Thomas,' People v. Harrison° and the lower court decision of the
instant case," has been avoided in some states by changing the law.' 2
England has abolished the felony-murder rule,'" and the Model Penal
Code has replaced it with a rebuttable presumption of malice.' 4
While Maryland accepts the felony-murder rule,'5 the question of
its extension as in the instant case has not come before the Court of
Appeals. Extension of the felony-murder rule has been considered in
a lower Maryland court, where the court held that the defendant's
plea that the fatal shot came from the gun of the victim's fellow officer
set up a valid defense to the charge.' 6
3. People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 (1965).
4. Id. at 446, 402 P.2d at 134.
5. See, e.g., Cadmus, The Beginning and End of Attempts and Felonies Under
The Felony-Murder Doctrine, 51 DICK. L. REv. 12 (1946) ; Hitchler, The Killer and
His Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53 DICK. L. Rev. 3 (1948) ; Morris, The Felon's
Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 50 (1956) ; Packer,
The Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. Rev. 252 at 259 (1961)
Note, 1961 DUKE L.J. 614.
6. E.g., People v. Washington, 40 Cal. Rptr. 791 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964),
reversed by instant case; People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952),
distinguished in People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963) ; Common-
wealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955), noted in 16 MD. L. Rev. 249
(1956), overruled by Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958),
noted in 18 MD. L. Rev. 169 (1958).
7. See, e.g., dissent in People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 447-51, 402 P.2d
130, 135-39 (1965).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 189 (1955).
9. 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
10. 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1959).
11. People v. Washington, 40 Cal. Rptr. 791 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
12. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (1909); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (1956).
13. English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, c. 11, §1.
14. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
15. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 407, 408, 410 & 411 (1957), applied, e.g., in
Oakley v. State, 238 Md. 48, 207 A.2d 472 (1965) ; Buettner v. State, 233 Md. 235,
196 A.2d 465 (1964) ; Stevens v. State, 232 Md. 33, 192 A.2d 73 (1963).
16. State v. Biggue, Criminal Court of Balto. City No. 2191 (July 25, 1938), noted
in 16 MD. L. lEv. 249, at 257, in which the defendant was involved in a gun battle with
two guards during an attempted robbery.
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In reversing the lower court's conviction in the noted case the
Supreme Court of California joins a growing minority of states which
limit the application of the felony-murder rule to cases other than
those in which the accused's co-felon is killed by a victim of the felony.17
LABOR LAW - State Court Not Preempted From Awarding
Damages For Libel Arising Out Of Labor Dispute. Meyer v.
Joint Council 53, Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 416 Pa. 401, 206 A.
2d 382 (1965). Plaintiffs were leaders of a labor organization which
was attempting to oust the defendant local unions as collective bar-
gaining representatives for certain employees. One week before the
NLRB representation election was held, the defendants stated in their
union newspaper that the plaintiffs had been individually convicted of
one or more of a list of crimes which included rape, robbery, and
manslaughter. The plaintiffs sued in the state court seeking damages
for libel. The defendants raised a preliminary objection by contend-
ing that the state court's jurisdiction was preempted by Section 7 or 8
of the National Labor Relations Act. The trial court dismissed this
objection, and the defendants appealed. In affirming the lower court's
ruling, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied on San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon.' In that case, the Supreme Court of the
United States said that, "Congress has entrusted administration of
the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency
[NLRB], armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its special-
ized knowledge and cumulative experience .. "2 To fulfill Congress'
intent to develop a uniform national labor policy, state jurisdiction
must yield to the exclusive authority of the NLRB when the activity
is arguably subject to Section 7 or 8' of the National Labor Relations
17. Butler v. People 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Moore,
121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1 0 8 ? (1905) ; Commonwealth v. Balliro, Mass ...... ,209 N.E.2d
308 (1965) ; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen (89 Mass.) 541 (1863) ; People v.
Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963) ; Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486,
137 A.2d 472 (1958) ; State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924). See
generally Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 210 (1950).
1. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The activity involved was peaceful picketing. The
Supreme Court found no "compelling state interest" and held that the state court
lacked jurisdiction to award damages for conduct constituting a tortious unfair labor
practice under state law.
2. Id., at 242.
3. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... 49 Stat. 452, as amended,
29 U.S.C.A. § 157.
Section 8 states what acts do or do not constitute an unfair labor practice and
defines collective bargaining. The particular sub-section which was in issue here is
8(c) which states: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis-
semination thereof, whether in written printed graphic, or visual form, shall not con-
stitute, or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c).
358 [VOL. XXV
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Act. However, in clarifying previous cases which had allowed state
courts to award damages for tortious activities marked by violence
and imminent threats to the public order,4 the Court established that
there is an exception to the theory of preemption based on the prin-
ciple that "the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our Federalism,
in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence
of clearly expressed congressional direction."' Applying the principles
of Garmon, the Pennsylvania court held that the state had a "compelling
state interest" in providing a "peaceful forum" to which libelled in-
dividuals could bring their claims. Despite the fact that the claims arise
out of a labor dispute, they are not to be ignored where the tortious
activity alleged was only of "peripheral concern" 6 to the NLRA.
Other courts, when considering whether state jurisdiction over a
libel arising out of a labor dispute is preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act, have used the Garmon rule to arrive at the opposite
result. Some have found preemption without considering the excep-
tions in the Garmon rule,7 while others have considered these exceptions
but have found that no "compelling state interest" exists8 or that the
libel was more than a peripheral concern of the NLRB.' In determin-
ing whether a "compelling state interest" exists, the courts have felt
that violence or the threat of violence is a necessary requirement under
the Garmon rule;1" the principal case expressly rejects such a narrow
interpretation.1
The Maryland courts have not yet been confronted with the ques-
tion of preemption in an action for damages for libel arising out of a
4. International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers, etc. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (damages for union's malicious inter-
ference with employee's lawful occupation); United Construction Workers, etc. v.
Labernum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (damages for union's agents threatening
and intimidating contractor's officers and employees so that contractor was unable to
continue with construction projects).
5. 359 U.S. 236, at 247; the Court also established that the states were not pre-
empted from the power to regulate "where the activity regulated was a merely periph-
eral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act." Id. at 243.
6. An activity is of "peripheral concern" where the particular activity is not
central to the interest protected by the NLRB - that of insuring an employee's right
of free choice. Few cases concerning libel have discussed "peripheral concern," but
those which have discussed it have reached a conclusion opposite to that of the
principal case. Infra note 9.
7. Troidl v. Keough, 254 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1964); Schnell Tool & Die Corp.
v. United Steel Workers of America, 200 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio C.P. 1964).
8. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964);
Inland Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Bergan,
57 L.R.R.M. 2296 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1964); Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964).
9. Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964)
Cf. Chauffeurs, Teamsters Local 150, IBT v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. Rep. 590 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1964) (court refused to grant an injunction against the libel).
10. See cases cited, supra note 7; see Merrifield, Federal-State Jurisdiction in
Labor Relations Law, 29 Gro. WASH. L. REv. 318, 338 (1960).
11. 206 A.2d 382, 385, n.10; the court cites California Dump Truck Owners
Ass'n v. Joint Council of Teamsters, 49 L.R.R.M. 2932, (Cal. Super. Ct. 1962), as in
accord with their holding, 206 A.2d at 385, n.9; however, the California court pointed
out that they were not bound by the Garmon rule since the alleged libel was not
related to a labor dispute. 49 L.R.R.M. 2932, at 2933.
19651
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labor dispute. However, the Court of Appeals has held that the state
court has jurisdiction over a tort action by an employer to recover
damages from the union for physical and economic injuries to the em-
ployer's business, where the tortious acts involved were an imminent
threat to public order."2
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS - Establishments Covered by
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Cuevas v. Sdrales, 344 F.2d 1019 (10th
Cir. 1965). Pinkney v. Meloy, 241 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
In Cuevas, a Negro sought injunctive relief under the Civil Rights
Act of 19641 to restrain a tavern operator from refusing to serve him.
The tavern served primarily beer and did not serve meals or other
food. The District Court dismissed the action and the Circuit Court,
on appeal, affirmed, holding that beer was not food within the meaning
of the act and therefore the tavern, at which no food was sold, was not
a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the act.'
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lists as covered places
"any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain,
or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption
on the premises" whose operations affect commerce.' Such establish-
ments as restaurants and department store lunch counters and tea-
rooms have been held to fall within its scope. It was the intention of
Congress, however, that bars and taverns should not be considered
places of public accommodation, and the principal case interprets the
act in this manner.' In Maryland, the 1963 Maryland Public Accom-
modations Act covers establishments serving food, but specifically
exempts those bars and taverns which are primarily devoted to the
sale of alcoholic beverages. 6
In Meloy, Negro plaintiffs brought an action under Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against defendant barber who refused
them service. Defendant's shop consisted of leased space in the base-
ment of a hotel, and the chairs were in turn leased to independent
barbers. The hotel was a place of public accommodation as defined by
the act, and the barbershop held itself out as available to hotel patrons,
although 95% of the barbershop patrons were local residents. The
District Court found that the barbershop was also a place of public
accommodation, and ruled that the proportion of local to transient
customers was not a criterion for coverage by the act.
12. See Solo Cup Co. v. International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper
Mill Workers AFL-CIO, 237 Md. 143, 205 A.2d 213 (1964).
1. 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
2. Accord, Tyson v. Cazes, 238 F. Supp. 937, 942 (D. La. 1965).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2).
4. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurant); Hamn v. City
of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (lunch counter and tearoom in department store).
5. 344 F.2d 1019, 1021-23.
6. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 49B, §§ 11, 12 (Supp. 1964).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes within its definition of
public accommodations, "any inn, hotel, motel, or other establish-
ment which provides lodging to transient guests."7 The definition also
includes "any establishment which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection,...
which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establish-
ment." ' Although all barbershops were not intended to be covered by
the act, its legislative history clearly shows that hotel barbershops,
such as in the principal case, were intended to be within its scope.
SERVICE OF PROCESS - Constitutionality of Maryland
Substitute Service Statute. Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d
546 (4th Cir. 1965). Charles Gkiafis, a Greek seaman, allegedly
suffered an injury while serving aboard the steamship Yiosonas in
the Port of Baltimore on September 5, 1961. Gkiafis subsequently
sued the Yiosonas and its owner, a Panamanian corporation. Juris-
diction over the shipowner was obtained by substitute service of process
on the State Department of Assessments and Taxation.' The ship-
owner filed a motion to quash service of process and dismiss the libel
contending, inter alia, that the Maryland statute2 which provides for
substituted service is unconstitutional. The defendant argued that the
procedure provided by the statute was not reasonably calculated to
insure notice to him, since there was no requirement for filing a return
receipt for the registered letter of notification sent to him. The trial
court upheld the constitutionality of the statute but granted the ship-
owner's motion to quash process on other grounds. The Fourth Circuit,
on appeal, held the Maryland substitute service statute constitutional.
The general rule as to the validity of substitute service statutes is
that the form of service provided for by the statute must be reasonably
calculated to give notice of the suit to the foreign corporation.3 Secur-
ing a return receipt from the foreign corporation and filing the receipt
with the court is not a prerequisite; it is only one of the possible
provisions which may be adopted.4 The statute involved in the instant
case required that notice of the suit be sent to the defendant by regis-
tered mail by an agency of the State of Maryland. The Fourth Circuit
cited an earlier court decision which indicated that there was no reason
to presume the State agency would not perform the duty imposed
upon it, and that therefore the statute was reasonably calculated to give
notice of the suit to the foreign corporation.5
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (4).
9. 241 F. Supp. 943, 946-47. See generally Sanders, The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
27 TExAs B.J. 931, 1016 (1964) ; Recent Statute, 78 HARV. L. Rev. 684, 687 (1965).
1. Pursuant to MD. CoDE ANN. art. 23, § 92(b) (1957).
2. MD. CODn ANN. art. 23, §§ 97 & 98 (1957).
3. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Wuchter v.
Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 30, comment e (1942).
4. Speir v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F. Supp. 432, 434 (D. Md. 1960).
5. Id. at 435.
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Early decisions dealing with the constitutionality of state statutes
providing for substitute service of process on foreign corporations are
in conflict.' A Nevada statute which did not require the Secretary of
State to forward to the defendant notice of the constructive service
was held unconstitutional,' while a similar Oklahoma statute was held
constitutional.' There is dictum in a Virginia case to the effect that
even if there had been no provision in the statute requiring the Secre-
tary of the Commonwealth to forward notice to a foreign corporation,
the statute would still have been held constitutional. A California
statute which did not require the Secretary of State to notify the foreign
corporation was held constitutional in a state court ;10 however, a federal
court later held the California statute unconstitutional."
The constitutionality of the Maryland substitute service statute
had been passed on twice previously. A state nisi prius opinion held
the statute unconstitutional;12 however, a Federal District Court subse-
quently held the statute constitutional.13 Apparently, the present decision
closes the question.
6. See Annot., 89 A.L.R. 658 (1934).
7. King Tonopah Mining Co. v. Lynch, 232 Fed. 485 (D. Nev. 1916).
8. Kaw Boiler Works v. Frymyer, 100 Okla. 81, 227 Pac. 453 (1924).
9. American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Fleishman, Morris & Co., 149 Va. 200, 141 S.E.
253, 258 (1928).
10. Olender v. Crystalline Mining Co., 149 Cal. 482, 86 Pac. 1082 (1906).
11. Knapp v. Bullock Tractor Co., 242 Fed. 543 (D. Cal. 1917).
12. Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Newcomb Detroid Co., Baltimore City Court,
Docket 91, p. 849 (1957).
13. Speir v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F. Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1960).
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